Office of the Inspector General

Eventually, any health care organization with an effective compliance program is very likely to discover an issue that raises potential liability and requires disclosure to a government entity. While we largely discuss False Claims Act (FCA) litigation and defense issues on this blog, a complementary issue is how to address matters that raise potential liability risks for an organization proactively.

On August 11, 2017, a group of affiliated home health providers in Tennessee (referred to collectively as “Home Health Providers”) entered into an FCA settlement agreement with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) for $1.8 million to resolve self-disclosed, potential violations of the Stark Law, the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, and a failure to meet certain Medicare coverage and payment requirements for home health services. This settlement agreement underscores the strategic considerations that providers must weigh as they face self-disclosing potential violations to the US government. Continue Reading DOJ Settlement with Home Health Providers Underscores Strategic Considerations for Self-Disclosure

On May 31, 2017, the US Department of Justice announced a Settlement Agreement under which eClinicalWorks, a vendor of electronic health record software, agreed to pay $155 million and enter into a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement to resolve allegations that it caused its customers to submit false claims for Medicare and Medicaid meaningful use payments in violation of the False Claims Act.

Read the full article.

The past three months have seen a flurry of advisory opinion activity from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). The majority of this activity focuses on patient assistance programs (PAPs) as donors and organizations continue to have questions about OIG’s most recent PAP guidance. While none of these opinions or modifications are dramatically new on their face, together they provide valuable insight into the types of facts that can mitigate the OIG’s general concerns with tailored disease funds.

Typically, sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturers and/or independent charity organizations with industry donors, PAPs provide financial assistance or free prescription drugs to low income individuals. Some PAPs are also structured to provide assistance to patients with a specific disease, like cancer or Crohn’s disease. As PAPs have the potential to be used by manufacturers to subsidize the purchase of their own products, or to improperly steer a patient’s drug selection, they can trigger scrutiny under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and Beneficiary Inducement Civil Monetary Penalty (CMP), among other laws. Not surprisingly, the OIG is more comfortable with bona fide charitable programs that are not drug-specific and that reflect other characteristics demonstrating a broad patient focus, rather than those reflecting a drug or pharmaceutical manufacturer focus.

Historically, the OIG has treated PAPs as important safety nets for patients who face chronic illnesses and high drug costs. The OIG issued a special advisory bulletin (SAB) in 2005 confirming that PAPs could help ensure patients had access to and could afford their medically necessary drugs. The OIG’s guidance evolved with its May 2014 SAB, which addressed the growing trend of independent charity PAPs establishing or operating specific disease funds that limit assistance to a subset of available products. The OIG articulated a concern with such PAPs, and indicated that it would view such programs as having a higher baseline risk of abuse when their assistance was limited to only a subset of available FDA-approved products for treatment of the disease. The OIG advised PAPs to define disease funds in accordance with widely recognized clinical standards and in a manner that covered a broad spectrum of products and manifestations of the disease (e.g., without reference to specific symptoms, drug stages, treatment types, severity of symptoms or other “narrowing” factors).

Consistent with this guidance, the OIG began issuing new advisory opinions and modifications of previous opinions in January 2015. The OIG’s opinions and modifications posted in the past three months are also consistent with this standard, but importantly add nuanced factors and exceptions that appear to show a more refined stance on specific disease funds. In December, the OIG posted a modification of Advisory Opinion 07-11, concerning a PAP that provided support for patients experiencing a specific symptom of cancer. In January, the OIG posted two new advisory opinions that addressed a PAP tailored to support patients with two specific diseases (a type of cancer and a type of chronic kidney disease) and a PAP providing support to needy patients with Stage 3 or Stage 4 of a specific disease, respectively. Also in January, the OIG posted a modification of Advisory Opinion 04-15, which addressed a PAP that maintained a disease fund limited to patients with certain metastatic cancers. While all of these specific disease funds may appear inconsistent with the OIG’s 2014 SAB, in each instance the OIG found that the tailored funds presented a low risk of abuse and merited a favorable opinion given the safeguards each employed.

In its Modification of Advisory Opinion 04-15, the OIG noted two factors that minimized the risk that the tailored disease fund could be leveraged by donors. First, the specific symptom of cancer was treatable by 62 different drugs made by 26 different manufacturers, so the program would not be supporting only one specific manufacturer or drug by tailoring its assistance to patients with the symptom. Second, and most importantly to the OIG, the PAP would not limit assistance through the fund just to drugs to treat that symptom; instead, the PAP would provide assistance for all medications prescribed for the qualifying patient’s underlying cancer and related symptoms. By certifying that the PAP would extend its support to underlying and related medical needs of patients with this symptom, the disease fund essentially agreed to expand the practical impact of the fund.

This “broadening” of support from otherwise narrowly defined disease funds can also be seen in the OIG’s other recent advisory opinions on the subject. In Opinions 15-16 and 15-17, for example, the OIG noted its favorable opinion was based in part on the PAPs’ representations that there were several different drugs made by various manufacturers currently available to treat each of the specific diseases and that the PAPs would, at a minimum, assist patients with all FDA-approved drugs to treat each disease (and, for the fund supporting patients with Stages 3 or 4 of the disease, would not limit the financial assistance to drugs expressly approved for advanced stages of the disease). In its Modification of Opinion 07-11, the PAP also noted that its support would not be limited to drugs expressly approved for the metastatic stage of the cancer. These opinions also include PAP certifications that if any of the PAP’s future disease funds would result in supporting only one FDA-approved drug treatment or one manufacturer, the PAP will also support the other medical needs of patients with the disease, including co-payment support for all prescription medication prescribed for the management and treatment of the patient’s disease (like pain and anti-nausea medications).

While the OIG continues to reiterate the potential risks posed by disease funds that are tailored to specific symptoms, severity of symptoms, method of drug administration, stages of a disease, or types of drug treatment, its recent opinions and modifications illustrate several exceptions to this general position. This recent flurry of OIG activity may be a good prompt for organizations with PAPs to review any specific disease funds in light of these most recent opinions.

RehabCare, the nation’s largest provider of nursing home rehabilitation services, agreed to pay $125 million on January 12 to settle claims under the False Claims Act (FCA) in connection with allegations that it caused its skilled nursing facility customers to submit false claims to Medicare for therapy services. In connection with the settlement, RehabCare entered into a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) with the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The provider’s companies, RehabCare Group, Inc. and RehabCare Group East, Inc. (RehabCare), have been subsidiaries of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. (Kindred) since their merger in 2011 with a Kindred subsidiary. In a press release, Kindred stated that it agreed to the settlement without any admission of wrongdoing in order to provide clarity for contract customers, shareholders and government oversight entities.

The government’s unsealed Complaint in Intervention alleged that RehabCare manipulated the amount and type of patient therapy to achieve a higher Medicare reimbursement level than was warranted for the patient. Skilled nursing facilities are reimbursed by Medicare by resource utility groups (RUGs), which reflect the anticipated costs associated with providing nursing and rehabilitation services to beneficiaries with similar characteristics or resource needs. A patient’s RUG is assigned based upon the time and type of therapy provided to the patient during a seven-day reference period, and the amount of reimbursement is tied to the RUG level that is determined during that reference period.

The CIA, which applies to both RehabCare and Kindred, has a five-year term and, among other requirements, provides for the development of staff training regarding the accurate use of RUGs, documentation of therapy services, coordination of care and other requirements for the provision of therapy. In addition, Kindred must engage an independent review organization to conduct annual medical necessity and appropriateness reviews related to contracted rehabilitation services. The CIA also requires the submission of annual reports that include certifications as to compliance with applicable federal health care program requirements and with the CIA from several executives of RehabCare and with executives of Kindred who have direct oversight responsibilities for RehabCare, including the compliance officer, CEO and CFO of Kindred.

The case was originally brought via a qui tam lawsuit filed by two former employees of RehabCare.  These individuals will receive approximately $24 million as their share of the recovery.

A copy of the DOJ press release is available here.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) annual release of a new Work Plan both summarizes the results achieved last year and highlights new areas for examination in the next. This year’s Work Plan reported rising audit results but declining investigative results, in contrast to previous years.

In examining the new topics added to the Work Plan, two themes emerge.  First, many of the new payment audits reflect OIG’s use of data mining to identify providers or suppliers who could potentially be considered “outliers” from the average use of a particular code or procedure. Data mining will also play a significant role in connection with the second theme—a notable increase in OIG’s review of significant, and some controversial, policy issues concerning changes in the country’s health care delivery system, operation of HHS programs and the effectiveness of HHS agency oversight of those changes and programs.

Based on how OIG identified new study topics, the main takeaway from the Work Plan is “know your data.” Whether the issue is Medicare claims or data reporting obligations, the OIG increasingly turns to data analytics to both generate audit or investigative leads or to study HHS program effectiveness.

To access a full analysis of the Work Plan, click here.

Amid bipartisan concerns in Congress and multiple U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies about health “information blocking,” the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently issued an alert reminding the health care industry that health information blocking can impact whether an arrangement satisfies the electronic health record (EHR) items and services safe harbor (42 C.F.R. § 1001.952) (EHR Safe Harbor) under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)).

The EHR Safe Harbor permits certain health care providers and other donors to pay up to 85 percent of the cost of EHR technology provided to a physician practice or other referral source if the arrangement meets all EHR Safe Harbor elements.  The third element of the EHR Safe Harbor requires that “The donor (or any person on the donor’s behalf) does not take any action to limit or restrict the use, compatibility, or interoperability of the items or services with other electronic prescribing or electronic health records systems (including, but not limited to, health information technology applications, products, or services).”

In the alert, the OIG cautions that information blocking may cause an arrangement that would otherwise satisfy the EHR Safe Harbor to fail to meet the third element. In an April 2015 report cited by the OIG in the alert, the Office of the National Coordinator of Health Information Technology defines information blocking: “Information blocking occurs when persons or entities knowingly and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information.”

Previously, the OIG expressed concern about this issue in the preamble to its final rule amending the EHR Safe Harbor in 2013, stating, “[D]onors must offer interoperable products and must not impede the interoperability of any electronic health record software they decide to offer . . . Agreements between a donor and a vendor that preclude or limit the ability of competitors to interface with the donated software would cause the donation to fail to meet the condition at 42 CFR 1001.952(y)(3), and thus preclude protection under the electronic health records safe harbor.” (78 Fed. Reg. 79202, 79209 [December 27, 2013]).

The alert cites several examples of information blocking that would threaten protection under the EHR Safe Harbor.  For example, if a provider limits the use or interoperability of software by agreeing with the potential referral source to prevent a competitor from interfacing with the software, the safe harbor requirements would not be satisfied.  Likewise, if the software vendor agrees with a provider to charge high interface fees to outside providers or suppliers or to competitors, the safe harbor requirements may not be satisfied.

In order to avoid running afoul of the AKS (and resulting False Claims Act [FCA] claims), health care providers considering the roll-out of below-cost EHR technology to physician practices or other referral sources should take care to avoid health information access restrictions that unreasonably interfere with access to information for continuity of care or other appropriate purposes and, thereby, threaten EHR Safe Harbor protection.

As many health lawyers know, the government usually only pursues the person or entity that offers or pays allegedly improper remuneration, even though the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) also applies to those to solicit or receive it.  This uneven enforcement pattern occurs for a variety of reasons — the alleged payor is the focus of the relator’s complaint and resulting investigation, the amount of time that this investigation and resolution takes can create practical and legal problems in pursuing additional defendants, and the increasing number of qui tam cases stretches the government’s limited resources.

However, on October 7, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a settlement with an alleged kickback recipient over three years after it settled with the alleged payor.  PharMerica Corporation, identified by the DOJ as the nation’s second-largest provider of pharmaceutical services to long-term care facilities, agreed to pay $9.25 million to settle allegations that, from 2001 to 2008, the company knowingly solicited and received kickbacks from Abbott Laboratories in the form of rebates, educational grants and other financial support in exchange for recommending that physicians prescribe Abbott’s anti-epileptic drug Depakote to nursing home patients where PharMerica provided pharmacy services.

PharMerica noted in a press release that it denied the government’s allegations and fully cooperated with the DOJ throughout the investigation.  Of note, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not require an amendment to PharMerica’s current corporate integrity agreement to add provisions concerning AKS compliance as part of this resolution.

This settlement comes over three years after Abbott entered into an FCA settlement agreement with the DOJ and several individual states in May 2012, which, along with addressing separate allegations related to the promotion of Depakote, settled allegations related to its arrangement with PharMerica. Abbott also did not admit to any wrongdoing in its settlement.  Both the PharMerica and Abbott settlements are the product of lawsuits filed in federal court in the Western District of Virginia under the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act.

The pursuit of the settlement with PharMerica may indicate a growing interest by DOJ in pursuing AKS allegations against both the alleged offeror and the alleged recipient of prohibited remuneration under the FCA.

On September 9, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released a memorandum to prosecutors nationwide regarding “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” authored by Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates.  Dubbed the “Yates Memorandum,” this missive consolidates both long-standing DOJ policy and newly minted guidance for prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys that could significantly alter the course of both criminal and civil investigations under the False Claims Act (FCA) particularly for health care entities.  The day after releasing the memo, Yates spoke at NYU School of Law, where she noted that DOJ’s mission is “not to recover the largest amount of money from the greatest number of corporations,” but rather, “to seek accountability from those who break our laws and victimize our citizens.”

At its core, the Yates Memorandum calls for a substantially increased focus on individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing and amendment of prior Department policies that have become standard operating procedures in both criminal and civil investigations.  While this is nothing new for FCA defendants, the renewed focus on individuals – and the corresponding guidance in the Yates Memorandum – will have an immediate and lasting impact on internal investigations, pre-intervention negotiations, litigation and any extra-judicial resolution of the case.

Leaving aside the policy statements that deal solely with internal DOJ operations, the Yates Memorandum outlines three key areas of focus that will be relevant for FCA defendants facing exposure from an investigation or qui tam litigation:

Increased Focus on Individuals

As part of this increased focus, corporations will be incentivized to tailor internal investigations to include a hard look at individuals.  First, the DOJ will limit or decline to provide “cooperation credit” unless the corporation “completely disclose[s] to the Department all relevant facts about individual misconduct.”  While the application of cooperation credit in criminal cases is more commonplace, the Yates Memorandum makes clear that this principle will apply equally in the civil context.  Citing the FCA, the Department’s position on “full cooperation” under 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(2) will be “at minimum, all relevant facts about responsible individuals must be provided.”  The Yates Memorandum also directs prosecutors and civil attorneys to proactively investigate individuals “at every step of the process – before, during, and after any corporate cooperation.”  By focusing on individuals from the inception of the investigation, the DOJ hopes to “increase the likelihood that individuals with knowledge of the corporate misconduct will cooperate with the investigation and provide information against individuals higher up the corporate hierarchy.”

The implications of these directives will impact all stages of the corporate response to an FCA investigation.  While the DOJ recognizes that investigations must be “tailored to the scope of the wrongdoing,” corporations should anticipate a need to expand internal investigations to gather facts and potentially assess the roles played by individuals in the overarching corporate wrongdoing at issue.  As the corporation seeks to resolve the corporate liability, the Yates Memorandum suggests that defense attorneys will be under increased pressure to focus attention on individual employees and former employees creating pressure to share information with the government regarding individuals in order to receive favorable treatment in the negotiated resolution.  While it is uncertain how the DOJ will value such cooperation, it is possible to envision a scenario where a favorable settlement for the corporation will only be reached if the Department perceives that the corporation was forthcoming about all individuals involved in the wrongdoing (as opposed to the “sacrificial lamb” that may have been put forth in the past).

Limited Release of Individuals When Resolving Corporate Case

In perhaps the most significant departure from the current regime for resolving FCA cases, the Yates Memorandum dictates that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, no corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability for any individuals.”  Such a directive discouraging prosecutors from providing a commonly expected settlement term in a civil FCA matter – i.e., the release from liability of the corporation’s officers, directors and current/former employees – could significantly complicate the settlement decision-making process of senior management.  In the absence of the traditional global civil and administrative release, not only could DOJ consider pursuing individuals under the FCA, but the Office of Inspector General (OIG) would also be free to consider pursuing individuals for civil monetary penalties.  OIG may have a different – and lower – dollar threshold for deciding to pursue those cases than DOJ.

Another aspect of the Yates Memorandum guidance is the directive that corporate cases will not be resolved without a “clear plan” to resolve related cases against individuals.  This guidance appears to be aimed at ensuring that prosecutors are diligent in their investigation of individuals in order to keep those efforts on track with the corporate resolution.

Relevance of Individual Ability to Pay

Finally, the Yates Memorandum calls on attorneys in civil enforcement efforts to look beyond an individual’s ability to pay as the basis for pursuit of claims against the individual.  In prior years, resource constraints at the DOJ have influenced the qui tam intervention decision‑making process.  Under the new guidance, civil attorneys are urged to consider the seriousness of the individual’s misconduct, whether it is actionable, whether the admissible evidence is likely to obtain and sustain a judgment, and whether pursuit of the action “reflects an important federal interest.”  Civil attorneys are advised to follow the model of their criminal prosecutor colleagues by considering the individual’s misconduct, past history and the circumstances related to the misconduct when determining whether to expend limited federal resources to pursue individual cases.  The Yates Memorandum notes that while cases against individuals may not result in substantial monetary recovery in the short-term, pursuit of these cases will result in “significant long-term deterrence.”  Whether the DOJ implements this directive remains to be seen.

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In summary, senior management, including boards of directors, in-house corporate counsel and chief compliance officers, should take notice of the Yates Memorandum and prepare for the ways this enhanced focus on litigating claims against individuals could impact the company’s action plans for responding to, defending and ultimately resolving FCA qui tam litigation.

On July 20, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) posted a new Advisory Opinion (the Opinion) addressing a health system’s restructured arrangement to lease employees, and provide other operational and management services, to a related psychiatric hospital (the Arrangement). The Opinion is a notable departure from other recent statements and enforcement actions, and signals a greater flexibility in how related entities may share non-clinical employees and operational expenses. It also shows the OIG’s willingness to consider more practical factors, such as cost reporting requirements and the systemic benefits from integrated entities behaving in cost-efficient ways, when determining the risk presented by an arrangement.

The Opinion concerns a nonprofit health system (System) with a membership interest in the psychiatric hospital (Center). The Center is also part of the System’s integrated health network.  The System and the Center are potential referral sources to each other. Currently, both parties have an existing arrangement, whereby the Center leases non-clinician employees and obtains certain other operational and management services from the System, paying the System’s fully loaded costs (e.g., salary, benefits, overhead expenses) plus a two percent administration fee. The Arrangement would continue the same relationship, but the Center would no longer pay the System the administration fee. The parties have asserted, and OIG verified, that the administrative fee is an unallowable cost under applicable Medicare cost-reporting rules, and would not be reimbursable by the Medicare program.

The OIG noted that the new Arrangement, where the System would provide the same services for less aggregate compensation, could raise fair market value (FMV) issues. Such a discount could be considered remuneration in exchange for the Center’s referrals. In addition, the aggregate compensation under the Arrangement can’t be set in advance as the System’s costs, and Center’s needs, may change during the term. Given these issues, the Arrangement would not meet the requirements of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) safe harbor for personal services and management contracts. Nonetheless, given the totality of the circumstances, the OIG concluded that the Arrangement would present a low risk of fraud and abuse and thus OIG would not impose sanctions.

The Opinion described several mitigating factors that, from OIG’s perspective, decreased the Arrangement’s risk of fraud and abuse. Not only did the parties attempt to structure the Arrangement to be in compliance with Medicare cost-reporting rules for related parties, there was also no evidence that the Arrangement was structured to, or actually would, induce referrals. Moreover, the parties pointed to the cost efficiencies of health system integration that would be promoted by the Arrangement, and to the potential indirect benefits (by way of cost savings) to federal health care programs.

The Opinion’s more flexible approach to analyzing the Arrangement stands in contrast to the OIG’s other recent activities, all of which express a consistent concern with payments between independent actors that are not consistent with FMV. For example, the OIG issued a fraud alert focusing on improper physician financial arrangements on June 9, 2015 (previously discussed here. The alert encourages physicians to “ensure that [their] arrangements reflect fair market value for bona fide services.” Similarly, the OIG has recently settled with several leased-employee physicians compensated by Fairmont Diagnostic Center and Open MRI Inc. (Fairmont) following Fairmont’s False Claims Act settlement concerning these arrangements. The OIG alleged that full time Fairmont employees, placed in certain physicians’ offices for study-related tasks, were actually performing office functions on the physician’s behalf, which constituted improper remuneration intended to induce referrals. Given this sustained regulatory focus on FMV compensation, health care entities should pay particular attention to the business justifications of their arrangements.

In U.S. ex rel. Boise v. Cephalon, Inc. (July 21, 2015), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that relators stated a claim under the 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G)—otherwise known as the “reverse false claims” provision of the False Claims Act (FCA)—based on alleged violations of a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA).

Cephalon’s CIA provided that failure to comply with its obligations “may” lead to monetary penalties, and that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) could demand penalties (which were stipulated at various dollar amounts in the CIA) after determining that penalties were appropriate. The relators alleged that Cephalon promoted medications off-label and paid unlawful kickbacks in violation of the CIA, entitling the OIG to stipulated penalties. They further claimed that by failing to report the violations and making false certifications of compliance, Cephalon improperly avoided its obligation to pay penalties in violation of § 3729(a)(1)(G).

The court denied Cephalon’s motion to dismiss, in which it argued that the penalty obligations in the CIA were contingent, inasmuch as the OIG could choose whether or not to demand payment of penalties. As such, Cephalon argued they could not give rise to reverse false claims because, absent a demand from OIG, there was no “obligation” to avoid within the statute’s meaning. After comparing other district courts’ treatment of this issue, the court concluded that Cephalon’s obligation to pay stipulated penalties was not contingent, and instead existed regardless of OIG’s payment demand. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that in stipulating penalties, “Cephalon and the government have already negotiated and contracted for the remedies that arise upon a breach of the CIA.”

The result in this case is unsound, as it sets up a potentially endless cycle of FCA liability. Defendants often must enter into CIAs with the OIG in connection with settling FCA claims.  CIAs impose onerous and expensive obligations, typically for five years, as part of the price of resolution and avoiding exclusion.  Under the reasoning of Cephalon, a CIA serves not just as a compliance mechanism but is itself a potential source of new FCA allegations by enterprising relators. Thus, a defendant may close one FCA door while at the same time opening another.

Moreover, in Cephalon, the alleged off-label promotion and kickbacks that the relators say give rise to the CIA violations are, according to the relators’ complaint, also a basis for “non-reverse” false claims under other provisions under the FCA (e.g., presentment, false records, conspiracy). In these circumstances, expanding the scope of potential FCA liability based on the same underlying conduct through a CIA-based reverse false claims theory is unduly expansive and at the same time unnecessarily duplicative. Indeed, to prevail on whether Cephalon failed to properly report or certify compliance under the CIA, the relator still needs to prevail on whether the off-label promotion or kickbacks occurred in the first place.

Cephalon is by no means the only, or the last, word on this issue. In U.S. ex rel. Booker v. Pfizer, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D. Mass. 2014), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts came to the opposite conclusion in a case involving similar allegations and a similarly worded CIA. The Booker court focused on the discretionary nature of the language in the CIA—i.e., the fact that violations “may” lead to penalties if the OIG demands them—and held that the CIA did not give rise to an obligation under the FCA’s reverse false claims provision. The court concluded that “[t]he discretion retained by the OIG here is thus the discretion whether to impose a penalty and thereby create an obligation to pay, rather than the discretion whether to enforce and existing obligation to pay.”

The result in Booker prevents CIAs from creating a new set of FCA landmines for providers who are seeking to resolve FCA claims. But as Cephalon demonstrates, the issue is far from settled.