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Remuneration? Not If It’s Fair Market Value, Says Eleventh Circuit

Bingham v. HCA, Inc., a recent Eleventh Circuit case, highlights the centrality of fair market value to Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) analyses. This decision is significant for several reasons and we expect to see Bingham cited by many defendants in future False Claims Act cases. The case is also a reminder that the current regulatory and enforcement environment can result in litigation over arrangements with fair market value payments that involve little, or no, compliance concerns.

One of the most fundamental elements of managing risk under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) is ensuring remuneration is consistent with fair market value. A recent Eleventh Circuit case highlights the centrality of fair market value to AKS analyses. See Bingham v. HCA, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-23671 (11th Cir. 2019). In Bingham, the court held that proving fair market value is an essential element for a relator to survive summary judgment and that relators must plead a lack of fair market value consistent with the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement to allege improper remuneration exists in the first place. The court’s holding is significant for two reasons: (1) it underscores that the plaintiff bears a burden in pleading and proving lack of fair market value, and (2) it suggests that fair market value compensation may be an absolute defense to an AKS allegation. We expect to see Bingham cited by many defendants in future False Claims Act cases, and we will be watching to see how the Eleventh Circuit and other courts continue to evaluate these concepts.

Case Background and Procedural History

We note that it took five years of costly litigation for HCA to reach this decision. Relator, who has filed a number of cases against hospital systems over the years concerning real estate deals, filed his first amended complaint on August 15, 2014. Relator alleged that HCA, through its Centerpoint Medical Center and Aventura Hospital facilities, violated the FCA due to improper space rental arrangements with physicians. Relator alleged that HCA allegedly paid a medical office building developer improper subsidies and that the developer passed the value of these subsidies onto physician tenants who signed 10-year leases through low initial lease rates, restricted use waivers, operating cash-flow shares and free office improvements. Relator also alleged HCA provided direct remuneration to physician tenants at the Aventura facility, including free parking, subsidized common area maintenance, free use permissions and below market rent.

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Eleventh Circuit Decision Expands Circuit Split on the FCA’s Statute of Limitations

On April 11, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit split from several other circuits on the question whether False Claims Act (FCA) relators can rely on the three-year statute of limitations extension in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in cases where the United States declines to intervene.

Under § 3731(b), an FCA case must be filed within the later of:

  1. 6 years after the date on which the violation…is committed, or
  2. 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed.

In United States of America, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy Inc. et al., No. 16-12836, the relator filed his claim more than six years after the alleged violations, but within three years of when he first informed the government of the facts giving rise to the claim. (He may have been delayed in filing his claim owing to the fact he was in federal prison for his role in a separate kickback scheme involving the same company.) Thus, the case turned on whether the three-year extension in § 3731(b)(2) applies to cases where the government has declined to intervene.

The district court’s answer was ‘no.’ It dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations. This approach was consistent with published decisions from the Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit—both of which emphasized that applying § 3731(b)(2) to cases where the Government did not intervene could lead to “bizarre scenarios” in which the statute of limitations period for a relator’s claim is dependent on a nonparty to the action. See United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F. 3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) and United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 726 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Surely, Congress could not have intended to base a statute of limitations on the knowledge of a non-party.”).

But, reviewing the district court’s decision on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit split from its sister circuits and reversed the decision below, resurrecting the relator’s claims. The court asserted that the Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit erred because they “reflexively applied the general rule that a limitations period is triggered by knowledge of a party. They failed to consider the unique role that the United States plays even in a non-intervened qui tam case.”

Instead, the court adopted a textual analysis, concluding that nothing in § 3731(b) suggests that the three-year extension applies only to intervened cases. Likewise, it rejected the defendants’ arguments that applying § 3731(b)(2) to non-intervened cases would render § 3731(b)(1) superfluous, and would encourage relators to wait to bring a secreted fraud to the government’s attention. The court emphasized that under its reading, § 3731(b)(1) would not be redundant in all circumstances, and that despite the three-year extension in paragraph [...]

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