Director and Officer Liability and Accountability

On April 23, 2019, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced it has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. (RDC), one of the 10 largest wholesale distributors of pharmaceutical products in the US, and filed felony criminal charges against two of RDC’s former senior executives for unlawful distribution of controlled substances (oxycodone and fentanyl) and conspiring to defraud the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). During the relevant time period (2012-2016), RDC’s sales of oxycodone increased by approximately 800 percent (from 4.7 million to 42.2 million tablets) and fentanyl increased by approximately 2,000 percent (from 63,000 to over 1.3 million dosages). The two charged executives are RDC’s former chief executive officer, Laurence F. Doud III, and the company’s former chief compliance officer, William Pietruszewski.

Geoffrey S. Berman, the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York, noted in a press release that the prosecution is “the first of its kind,” with RDC and its former chief executive officer and former chief compliance officer charged with “drug trafficking, trafficking the same drugs that are fueling the opioid epidemic that is ravaging this country.” Keeping the focus on the C-suite, Mr. Berman emphasized that his office “will do everything in its power to combat this epidemic, from street-level dealers to the executives who illegally distribute drugs from their boardrooms.”

Ray Donovan, the DEA Special Agent in Charge of the investigation, underscored this sentiment:

Today’s charges should send shock waves throughout the pharmaceutical industry reminding them of their role as gatekeepers of prescription medication.  The distribution of life-saving medication is paramount to public health; similarly, so is identifying rogue members of the pharmaceutical and medical fields whose diversion contributes to the record-breaking drug overdoses in America . . . . This historic investigation unveiled a criminal element of denial in RDC’s compliance practices, and holds them accountable for their egregious non-compliance according to the law.”

A consistent theme across the three cases is the alleged deficiency in RDC’s compliance program—as well as the role that the former CEO and compliance chief allegedly played in directing RDC to ignore its obligations to maintain “effective control[s] against diversion of particular controlled substances into other than legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels” under 21 USC § 823(b)(1) and reporting suspicious orders under 21 CFR § 1301.74(b). The criminal pleadings include allegations that:


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