Compliance Developments

In this second installment of the Healthcare Enforcement Quarterly Roundup for 2019, we cover several topics that have persisted over the past few years and identify new issues that will shape the scope of enforcement efforts for the remainder of this year and beyond. In this Quarterly Roundup, we discuss DOJ’s guidance on compliance

Last month, the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the release of formal guidance to DOJ civil attorneys on how to award “cooperation credit” to defendants who cooperate with the Department during a False Claims Act (FCA) investigation. The formal policy, added to the Justice Manual Section 4-4.112, identifies the type of cooperation eligible for credit.

As announced by Assistance Attorney General Jody Hunt, DOJ believes the guidance reflects “important steps to incentivize companies to voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate with our investigations … False Claims Act defendants may merit a more favorable resolution by providing meaningful assistance to the Department of Justice—from voluntary disclosure, which is the most valuable form of cooperation, to various other efforts, including the sharing of information gleaned from an internal investigation and taking remedial steps through new or improved compliance programs.”

Under the policy, cooperation credit in FCA cases may be earned by 1) voluntarily disclosing misconduct unknown to the government, 2) cooperating in an ongoing investigation or 3) undertaking remedial measures in response to a violation. The first type of cooperation is straightforward: self-disclosure before a government investigation begins.

The second type of cooperation has two flavors. First, where the government has already initiated an investigation, a company may receive credit for disclosing other misconduct uncovered by the company through the course of its internal investigation that is unknown to the government. Second, DOJ lists 10 examples of other cooperative activities for which a company may earn credit for undertaking during an investigation, including

  • Identifying individuals substantially involved or responsible for the conduct;
  • Admitting liability or “accepting responsibility” for the conduct; or
  • Assisting the government in its investigation by, for example, preserving relevant documents and information beyond existing business practices or legal requirements, identifying individuals who are aware of relevant information or conduct, and facilitating review and evaluation of data or information that requires access to special or proprietary technologies.

The third type of cooperation involves taking into account remedial actions that a company has taken in response to a FCA violation. Such remedial measures may include

  • Undertaking a thorough analysis of the root cause of the misconduct;
  • Implementing or improving an effective compliance program designed to ensure the misconduct or similar problem does not occur again;
  • Appropriately disciplining or replacing those responsible for the misconduct;
  • Accepting responsibility for the violation; and
  • Implementing or improving compliance programs to prevent a recurrence.


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Boards and management should make use of recent expanded guidance from the US Department of Justice to ensure that their compliance programs are considered “effective” if and when an investigation arises. Companies should affirmatively answer three fundamental questions in evaluating a compliance program:

  1. Is the compliance program well designed?
  2. Is the program being implemented effectively

On April 23, 2019, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced it has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. (RDC), one of the 10 largest wholesale distributors of pharmaceutical products in the US, and filed felony criminal charges against two of RDC’s former senior executives for unlawful distribution of controlled substances (oxycodone and fentanyl) and conspiring to defraud the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). During the relevant time period (2012-2016), RDC’s sales of oxycodone increased by approximately 800 percent (from 4.7 million to 42.2 million tablets) and fentanyl increased by approximately 2,000 percent (from 63,000 to over 1.3 million dosages). The two charged executives are RDC’s former chief executive officer, Laurence F. Doud III, and the company’s former chief compliance officer, William Pietruszewski.

Geoffrey S. Berman, the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York, noted in a press release that the prosecution is “the first of its kind,” with RDC and its former chief executive officer and former chief compliance officer charged with “drug trafficking, trafficking the same drugs that are fueling the opioid epidemic that is ravaging this country.” Keeping the focus on the C-suite, Mr. Berman emphasized that his office “will do everything in its power to combat this epidemic, from street-level dealers to the executives who illegally distribute drugs from their boardrooms.”

Ray Donovan, the DEA Special Agent in Charge of the investigation, underscored this sentiment:

Today’s charges should send shock waves throughout the pharmaceutical industry reminding them of their role as gatekeepers of prescription medication.  The distribution of life-saving medication is paramount to public health; similarly, so is identifying rogue members of the pharmaceutical and medical fields whose diversion contributes to the record-breaking drug overdoses in America . . . . This historic investigation unveiled a criminal element of denial in RDC’s compliance practices, and holds them accountable for their egregious non-compliance according to the law.”

A consistent theme across the three cases is the alleged deficiency in RDC’s compliance program—as well as the role that the former CEO and compliance chief allegedly played in directing RDC to ignore its obligations to maintain “effective control[s] against diversion of particular controlled substances into other than legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels” under 21 USC § 823(b)(1) and reporting suspicious orders under 21 CFR § 1301.74(b). The criminal pleadings include allegations that:


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This latest installment of the Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup reflects on trends that persisted in 2018 and those emerging trends that will carry us into 2019 and beyond. Leading off with the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) December announcement of its fiscal year 2018 False Claims Act (FCA) recoveries, it remains clear that the

In the latest installment of Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup, we examine key enforcement trends in the health care industry that we have observed over the past few months. In this issue, we report on:

  • Practical applications of recent guidance from the US Department of Justice (DOJ)
  • A recent blow to DOJ’s effort to

This week, the Sixth Circuit declined the en banc petition of Brookdale Senior Living Communities to revisit a three-judge panel’s two-to-one decision to permit the Relator’s third amended complaint to move forward. We previously analyzed this decision here. The court’s one-page order did not explain the reasoning for declining the petition, although it noted

On August 24, 2018, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a request for information, seeking input from the public on potential new safe harbors to the Anti-Kickback Statute and exceptions to the beneficiary inducement prohibition in the Civil Monetary Penalty (CMP) Law to remove impediments to care

How will key trends and developments in health care policy and enforcement impact future litigants? In the latest Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup, we address this question in the context of:

  • Continued interpretations of the landmark Escobar case
  • The latest guidance from US Department of Justice (DOJ) leadership regarding enforcement priorities
  • The uptick in

The materiality test articulated in Escobar has become one of the most litigated issues in False Claims Act (FCA) practice. Most courts have taken to heart the Supreme Court’s direction that materiality is a “demanding” and “rigorous” test in which “minor or insubstantial” non-compliance would not qualify as material. However, a recent Sixth Circuit two-to-one decision found that noncompliance with a physician signature timing requirement sufficiently alleged materiality under Escobar, reversing the district court’s dismissal of the case. United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 892 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 2018). This opinion arguably is inconsistent with Escobar. The better analysis of Relator’s complaint would conclude that the Relator pled insufficient facts, under the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, to suggest that the untimely physician signature somehow resulted in the government paying for home health services for which it otherwise would not have paid.

Case Summary

This decision was Relator’s second time before the Sixth Circuit litigating the complaint she filed in 2012 against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., and related entities (Brookdale) after the government declined to intervene. The dispute centers around compliance with the regulation, 42 C.F.R. §424.22(a), which pertains to home health services. Section 424.22(a) provides that a “physician must certify the patient’s eligibility for the home health benefit,” including that the individual is home bound and eligible for home care under Medicare’s coverage rules. Subsection (a)(2) has a timing requirement for this certification; “the certification of need for home health services must be obtained at the time the plan of care is established or as soon thereafter as possible and must be signed and dated by the physician who establishes the plan.” Relator alleged that she was engaged to help Brookdale deal with a large backlog of Medicare claims, including obtaining physician certifications months after a patient’s treatment began. She argued that claims with these “late” certifications violated § 424.22(a)(2) and rendered those claims false under an implied certification theory.
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