A few days before Thanksgiving, the news media published an internal memo by the Office of General Counsel (OGC) at the US Department of Health and Human Services (Department) to officials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The memo expressed OGC’s views on the impact of the Supreme Court’s Azar v. Allina
On October 9, 2019, the US Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published proposed changes to the physician self-referral law (Stark Law). Physician practices are subject to the Stark Law, and the proposed rule includes an important clarification affecting certain group practices’ compensation models.
CMS proposes to revise its regulations to clarify the special rule for group practice distributions of income from Stark designated health services (DHS). Compliance with this special rule is a requirement of the Stark Law’s definition of a “group practice,” and compliance with the “group practice” definition is generally necessary for physician groups to have the protection of the in-office ancillary services (IOAS) exception to the Stark Law. The special rule for sharing DHS profits permits a group, or a pod of five or more physicians in the group, to pool their DHS income and distribute the pool in a manner that does not directly take into account the volume or value of any physician’s referrals for DHS.
For years, there has been a debate within the health law bar regarding how these DHS income pools can be structured under the special rule. One position is that the special rule permits pools to be organized by DHS, meaning, for example, that if the group’s only DHS are imaging and physical therapy services (PT), the group can have one pool for diagnostic imaging income in which one set of five or more physicians participate, and another pool for PT income in which another (perhaps overlapping) set of five or more physicians participate (split-DHS income pooling). The other position is that the special rule requires that the DHS income pool must include all the DHS generated by the participating physicians. In such a case, the imaging and PT pools described above would have to be consolidated (all-DHS income pooling).
Featuring insights from government representatives, in-house lawyers and compliance officers from across the healthcare and life sciences landscape, attendees will learn strategies for proactively managing and effectively responding to compliance risks, investigations and litigation during this day-long…
On October 9, 2019, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published proposed changes to the physician self-referral law (Stark Law) (Stark Proposed Rule) and the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Beneficiary Inducement Civil Monetary Penalty Law (CMPL) (AKS Proposed Rule).
The proposed rules represent some of the most significant potential changes to these laws in the last decade. HHS Deputy Secretary Eric Hargan said that they “would be a historic reform of how healthcare is regulated in America.” This On the Subject provides a high-level overview of key provisions in the proposed rules. More in-depth analysis will follow at our Regulatory Sprint Resource Page.
The Stark Law and AKS Proposed Rules have been promulgated as part of HHS’s “Regulatory Sprint to Coordinated Care,” which was launched in 2018 with the goal of reducing regulatory burden and incentivizing coordinated care. As part of this initiative, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) began scrutinizing a variety of long-standing regulatory requirements and prohibitions to determine whether they unnecessarily hinder the innovative arrangements that policymakers are otherwise hoping to see develop. The agencies took the step of formally seeking public input on this topic by issuing requests for information (RFIs) in June and August 2018. More information about HHS’s Sprint and the RFIs is available on our Regulatory Sprint Resource Page.
The Proposed Rules reflect a coordinated effort between CMS and OIG to address various challenges to the transition to value-based care. Both agencies clearly recognize that the two laws often operate in tandem, but they also emphasize that they are distinct and separate enforcement vehicles. Thus, in some instances OIG’s proposals may be more restrictive that CMS’s, and both agencies state that the AKS may act as a “backstop” to protect against arrangements that meet a Stark Law exception but are nonetheless considered abusive. CMS also proposes to remove compliance with the AKS as a requirement from several Stark Law exceptions, further underscoring the laws’ separateness.
In this second installment of the Healthcare Enforcement Quarterly Roundup for 2019, we cover several topics that have persisted over the past few years and identify new issues that will shape the scope of enforcement efforts for the remainder of this year and beyond. In this Quarterly Roundup, we discuss DOJ’s guidance on compliance…
Last month, the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the release of formal guidance to DOJ civil attorneys on how to award “cooperation credit” to defendants who cooperate with the Department during a False Claims Act (FCA) investigation. The formal policy, added to the Justice Manual Section 4-4.112, identifies the type of cooperation eligible for credit.
As announced by Assistance Attorney General Jody Hunt, DOJ believes the guidance reflects “important steps to incentivize companies to voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate with our investigations … False Claims Act defendants may merit a more favorable resolution by providing meaningful assistance to the Department of Justice—from voluntary disclosure, which is the most valuable form of cooperation, to various other efforts, including the sharing of information gleaned from an internal investigation and taking remedial steps through new or improved compliance programs.”
Under the policy, cooperation credit in FCA cases may be earned by 1) voluntarily disclosing misconduct unknown to the government, 2) cooperating in an ongoing investigation or 3) undertaking remedial measures in response to a violation. The first type of cooperation is straightforward: self-disclosure before a government investigation begins.
The second type of cooperation has two flavors. First, where the government has already initiated an investigation, a company may receive credit for disclosing other misconduct uncovered by the company through the course of its internal investigation that is unknown to the government. Second, DOJ lists 10 examples of other cooperative activities for which a company may earn credit for undertaking during an investigation, including
- Identifying individuals substantially involved or responsible for the conduct;
- Admitting liability or “accepting responsibility” for the conduct; or
- Assisting the government in its investigation by, for example, preserving relevant documents and information beyond existing business practices or legal requirements, identifying individuals who are aware of relevant information or conduct, and facilitating review and evaluation of data or information that requires access to special or proprietary technologies.
The third type of cooperation involves taking into account remedial actions that a company has taken in response to a FCA violation. Such remedial measures may include
- Undertaking a thorough analysis of the root cause of the misconduct;
- Implementing or improving an effective compliance program designed to ensure the misconduct or similar problem does not occur again;
- Appropriately disciplining or replacing those responsible for the misconduct;
- Accepting responsibility for the violation; and
- Implementing or improving compliance programs to prevent a recurrence.
On May 13, the US Supreme Court (the Court) unanimously ruled in Cochise Consultancy, Inc., v. U.S. ex rel. Hunt that the “government knowledge” statute of limitations under the federal False Claims Act (FCA), §31 U.S.C. 3729, et seq., applies regardless of whether the government intervenes in a case. As a result, in some circumstances, relators will have up to four years longer to file qui tam claims.
The FCA permits a relator bring a qui tam civil action on behalf of the federal government against “any person” who “knowingly presents . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment” to the government or to certain third parties acting on the government’s behalf. 31 U. S. C. §3730(b). The relator must deliver a copy of the complaint and supporting evidence to the government, which then has 60 days to decide whether to intervene in the action. During this time, the complaint remains under seal. If the government intervenes, it assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting the case, although the relator may continue to participate. If the government does not intervene, the relator has the right to pursue the case alone. The relator receives a share of any proceeds from the action, generally 15-25 percent if the government intervenes and 25-30 percent if it does not intervene.
The general statute of limitations for all civil actions under Section 3730 of the FCA requires that cases be filed within six years of the alleged violation or three years after relevant material facts are known or should have been known by the “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances,” whichever is later, but not more than 10 years after the violation. 31 U.S.C. §3731.
Boards and management should make use of recent expanded guidance from the US Department of Justice to ensure that their compliance programs are considered “effective” if and when an investigation arises. Companies should affirmatively answer three fundamental questions in evaluating a compliance program:
- Is the compliance program well designed?
- Is the program being implemented effectively
On April 23, 2019, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced it has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. (RDC), one of the 10 largest wholesale distributors of pharmaceutical products in the US, and filed felony criminal charges against two of RDC’s former senior executives for unlawful distribution of controlled substances (oxycodone and fentanyl) and conspiring to defraud the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). During the relevant time period (2012-2016), RDC’s sales of oxycodone increased by approximately 800 percent (from 4.7 million to 42.2 million tablets) and fentanyl increased by approximately 2,000 percent (from 63,000 to over 1.3 million dosages). The two charged executives are RDC’s former chief executive officer, Laurence F. Doud III, and the company’s former chief compliance officer, William Pietruszewski.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York, noted in a press release that the prosecution is “the first of its kind,” with RDC and its former chief executive officer and former chief compliance officer charged with “drug trafficking, trafficking the same drugs that are fueling the opioid epidemic that is ravaging this country.” Keeping the focus on the C-suite, Mr. Berman emphasized that his office “will do everything in its power to combat this epidemic, from street-level dealers to the executives who illegally distribute drugs from their boardrooms.”
Ray Donovan, the DEA Special Agent in Charge of the investigation, underscored this sentiment:
Today’s charges should send shock waves throughout the pharmaceutical industry reminding them of their role as gatekeepers of prescription medication. The distribution of life-saving medication is paramount to public health; similarly, so is identifying rogue members of the pharmaceutical and medical fields whose diversion contributes to the record-breaking drug overdoses in America . . . . This historic investigation unveiled a criminal element of denial in RDC’s compliance practices, and holds them accountable for their egregious non-compliance according to the law.”
A consistent theme across the three cases is the alleged deficiency in RDC’s compliance program—as well as the role that the former CEO and compliance chief allegedly played in directing RDC to ignore its obligations to maintain “effective control[s] against diversion of particular controlled substances into other than legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels” under 21 USC § 823(b)(1) and reporting suspicious orders under 21 CFR § 1301.74(b). The criminal pleadings include allegations that:
In this first installment of the Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup for 2019, we continue to monitor trends we identified in 2018 and introduce new enforcement efforts that are expected to persist in the coming year. In this Roundup, we focus on increased enforcement activity against electronic health record (EHR) companies, enforcement against individuals…