This week, the Sixth Circuit declined the en banc petition of Brookdale Senior Living Communities to revisit a three-judge panel’s two-to-one decision to permit the Relator’s third amended complaint to move forward. We previously analyzed this decision here. The court’s one-page order did not explain the reasoning for declining the petition, although it noted that the dissenting judge voted in favor of re-hearing.
Fortunately, most courts have taken to heart the Supreme Court’s direction that materiality is a “demanding” and “rigorous” test in which “minor or insubstantial” non-compliance would not qualify as material. However, the Sixth Circuit’s decision that noncompliance with a physician signature timing requirement sufficiently alleged materiality under Escobar arguably is inconsistent with Escobar. The better analysis of the Relator’s complaint would conclude that the Relator pled insufficient facts, under the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, to suggest that the untimely physician signature somehow resulted in the government paying for home health services for which it otherwise would not have paid. As the dissenting opinion noted, the Sixth Circuit created the “timing” requirement in a prior opinion in this matter. Given this unusual circumstance, this case may be distinguishable in other cases in which the court is less constrained by their prior ruling.
