Last month, Insys Therapeutics, Inc. announced that it reached a settlement-in-principle with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to settle claims that it knowingly offered and paid kickbacks to induce physicians and nurse practitioners to prescribe the drug Subsys and that it knowingly caused Medicare and other federal health care programs to pay for non-covered uses of the drug. The drugmaker agreed to pay at least $150 million and up to $75 million more based on “contingent events.” According to a status report filed by DOJ, the tentative agreement is subject to further approval and resolution of related issues. The settlement does not resolve state civil fraud and consumer protection claims against the company.

The consolidated lawsuits subject to the settlement allege that Insys violated the False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback Statute in connection with its marketing of Subsys, a sub-lingual spray form of the powerful opioid fentanyl. The Food and Drug Administration has approved Subsys for, and only for, the treatment of persistent breakthrough pain in adult cancer patients who are already receiving, and tolerant to, around-the-clock opioid therapy. The government’s complaint alleges that Insys provided kickbacks in the form of arrangements disguised as otherwise permissible activities. Specifically, it alleges that Insys instituted a sham speaker program, paying thousands of dollars in fees to practitioners for speeches “attended only by the prescriber’s own office staff, by close friends who attended multiple presentations, or by people who were not medical professionals and had no legitimate reason for attending.” Many of these speeches were held at restaurants and did not include any substantive presentation. Insys also allegedly provided jobs for prescribers’ friends and relatives, visits to strip clubs, and lavish meals and entertainment. Continue Reading Insys Announces Settlement-in-Principle with DOJ Over Alleged Subsys Kickback Scheme

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2016 Escobar decision, the majority of litigation regarding that decision’s impact has concerned the issue of materiality. While the materiality predicate to False Claims Act (FCA) liability announced in Escobar has certainly assumed top billing, another aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision is increasingly getting attention: that is, whether the two-part test for applicability of the implied certification theory of FCA liability is mandatory.

In Escobar, the Supreme Court held that the implied certification theory “can be a basis for liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied: first, the claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory or contractual provisions makes those representations misleading half-truths.”

Since this pronouncement, lower courts have grappled with whether all implied certification FCA cases must satisfy this two-part test, or whether the Supreme Court simply intended to describe a non-exhaustive set of factors that could give rise to an implied certification claim.  This is important, in part, because not all claims for payment submitted to government payors actually describe or make representations about the goods or services provided, thus failing part one of the test.

In prior cases, such as the one we reported on here, panels of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that the two-part test is mandatory. A Ninth Circuit panel reaffirmed this holding on August 24, 2018, albeit with a total lack of enthusiasm. In United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute, the court stated that “while the [Supreme] Court did not state that its two conditions were the only way to establish liability under an implied false certification theory,” the panel was “bound by [prior] three-judge panels of this court” interpreting Escobar. The Rose court went on to suggest that the Ninth Circuit hearing the case en banc might decide the issue differently. (No petition for rehearing en banc has yet been filed in Rose; any such petition is not due until October 9, because of an extension of time for filing).

The skepticism about the mandatory nature of the Escobar two-part test expressed by the Ninth Circuit panel in Rose is unwarranted. First, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Escobar for the very purpose of resolving whether the implied certification theory of FCA liability is viable and if so, to what extent. The notion that the Supreme Court would then have laid out two “conditions” for implied certification liability, labeled them “conditions,” but not have actually meant them to be “conditions,” makes little sense.

While some advocates for the contrary view (including the government) have grasped onto the phrase “at least” in the Supreme Court’s opinion to suggest that the “conditions” are instead non-exhaustive “examples” of situations where implied certification claims may proceed, such reasoning is flawed: the use of the term “at least” conveys that the two conditions are the minimum necessary components of a viable implied certification claim. This point is underscored when the phrase “at least” is used in a (somewhat) more conventional sentence. For example, if a person says, “I like skydiving, at least when I’m wearing a parachute,” one would not conclude that there are situations in which the person would entertain skydiving without a parachute.

We will have to wait and see what happens if the Ninth Circuit has occasion to address the Escobar two-part test en banc.

This week, the Sixth Circuit declined the en banc petition of Brookdale Senior Living Communities to revisit a three-judge panel’s two-to-one decision to permit the Relator’s third amended complaint to move forward. We previously analyzed this decision here. The court’s one-page order did not explain the reasoning for declining the petition, although it noted that the dissenting judge voted in favor of re-hearing.

Fortunately, most courts have taken to heart the Supreme Court’s direction that materiality is a “demanding” and “rigorous” test in which “minor or insubstantial” non-compliance would not qualify as material. However, the Sixth Circuit’s decision that noncompliance with a physician signature timing requirement sufficiently alleged materiality under Escobar arguably is inconsistent with Escobar. The better analysis of the Relator’s complaint would conclude that the Relator pled insufficient facts, under the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, to suggest that the untimely physician signature somehow resulted in the government paying for home health services for which it otherwise would not have paid. As the dissenting opinion noted, the Sixth Circuit created the “timing” requirement in a prior opinion in this matter. Given this unusual circumstance, this case may be distinguishable in other cases in which the court is less constrained by their prior ruling.

On August 24, 2018, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a request for information, seeking input from the public on potential new safe harbors to the Anti-Kickback Statute and exceptions to the beneficiary inducement prohibition in the Civil Monetary Penalty (CMP) Law to remove impediments to care coordination and value-based care. The broad scope of the laws involved and the wide-ranging nature of OIG’s request underscore the potential significance of anticipated regulatory reforms for virtually every healthcare stakeholder.

The request for information follows a similar request by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published on June 25, 2018, regarding the physician self-referral law, commonly known as the Stark Law. Both of these requests are part of HHS’s “Regulatory Sprint to Coordinated Care,” which is being spearheaded by the Deputy Secretary as an effort to address regulatory obstacles to coordinated care.

The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting or receiving anything of value in exchange for or to induce a person to make referrals for items and services that are payable by a federal health care program, or to purchase, lease, order or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing or ordering any services or items that may be covered by a federal health care program. The beneficiary inducement prohibition in the CMP Law authorizes the imposition of civil money penalties for paying or offering any remuneration to a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary that the offeror knows or should know is likely to influence the beneficiary’s selection of a particular provider or supplier of Medicare or Medicaid payable items. Many value-based payment models implicate these statutes, and the OIG acknowledges that they are widely viewed as impediments to arrangements that would advance coordinated care.

While the request for information arises in the context of a concerted focus on care coordination and value-based payment, the request is wide-ranging and effectively invites stakeholders to provide comments on a broad range of potential issues under both the Anti-Kickback Statute and the beneficiary inducement prohibition. The OIG solicits comments across four general categories: (1) promoting care coordination and value-based care; (2) beneficiary engagement, including beneficiary incentives and cost-sharing waivers; (3) other regulatory topics, including feedback on current fraud and abuse waivers, cybersecurity-related items and services, and new exceptions required by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018; and (4) the intersection of the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute.

The OIG encourages individuals and organizations who previously submitted comments to CMS in response to its request for information on the Stark Law to also submit comments directly to OIG, even where those comments may be duplicative, to ensure they are considered by OIG as it exercises its independent authority with respect to the Anti-Kickback Statute and CMP Law.

Comments are due by October 26, 2018.

On August 7, 2018, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissing a qui tam suit against the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. (AHF), finding that the payments made to AHF employees for referring patients to AHF were protected by the employment safe harbor of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS).

In Jack Carrel, et al. v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation, the relator claimed that AHF, a nonprofit organization that provides medical services to patients with HIV/AIDS, paid kickbacks to employees in exchange for referring HIV-positive patients for health care services billed to federal health care programs in violation of the AKS and both the Florida and federal False Claims Acts (FCA). The relators, each former AHF directors or managers, specifically cited two allegedly representative false claims in which an employee was paid $100 for referring patients to AHF for completing follow up clinical services that were billed to the Ryan White Program. The Department of Justice and the State of Florida declined to intervene.

In response to AHF’s initial motion to dismiss on May 8, 2015, the district court dismissed all but two of the relators’ claims for lack of particularity, but permitted the claims related to payments to employees for referrals to proceed into discovery. In June 2017, after the conclusion of discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to AHF on the remaining two claims based on the applicability of employee safe harbor. Under the AKS employee safe harbor (42 U.S.C. § § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B); 42 C.F.R. 1001.152(i)), the definition of “remuneration” excludes “any amount paid by an employer to an employee, who has a bona fide employment relationship with the employer, for employment in the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs.”  Continue Reading Circuit Court Affirms Payments for Referrals Made to Employees are Protected by the AKS Safe Harbor

On June 29, 2018, federal district courts in California and Kentucky issued conflicting decisions over the deference owed to prosecutors in seeking to dismiss frivolous False Claims Act (FCA) claims and the effect of the January 2018 Granston Memo, which recognized dismissal as an “important tool” to advance governmental interests, preserve limited resources and avoid adverse precedent.

In United States et al. v. Academy Mortgage Corporation (N.D. Cal.), the relator, an underwriter at Academy Mortgage Corporation (Academy), claimed that a mortgage loan originator violated the FCA by falsely certifying loans for government housing insurance. The government declined to intervene after the relator filed her initial complaint, which limited the alleged misconduct to a one-year period at the specific branch where the relator was employed. The relator next filed an amended complaint that included additional allegations and identified specific employees allegedly complicit in the fraud. This time, the government moved to dismiss the complaint under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), which authorizes the government to move to dismiss an FCA action even though it did not intervene in the litigation, as it remains the real party in interest.

In its motion to dismiss, the government argued that allowing the suit to continue would drain government resources and was not justified by a cost-benefit analysis. The government also argued that its conclusion that dismissal was appropriate was subject to deference. Continue Reading Recent District Court Decisions Highlight Conflicting Stances on Dismissal of Frivolous FCA Claims

During a July 17, 2018, hearing before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Deputy Secretary Eric Hargan testified about HHS’ efforts to review and address obstacles that longstanding fraud and abuse laws pose to shifting the Medicare payment system to a value-based, coordinated care payment system. Deputy Secretary Hargan confirmed that the agency is looking at regulatory reforms to both the physician self-referral law (Stark Law) and the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) as part of HHS’ “Regulatory Sprint to Coordinate Care.”

According to Hargan’s testimony, “the goal of the sprint is to remove regulatory barriers to coordinated care while ensuring patient safety. We want to genuinely engage stakeholders in this effort, and solicit feedback at each stage—but this is a sprint, not a jog. These words were chosen specifically because we want to fix, as quickly as possible, the regulatory processes that have increased provider burden.”

As part of this Sprint, in June the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a broad Stark Law Request for Information (RFI) that solicited public comments on how the Stark Law impedes care coordination and how Stark Law exceptions could be modified or create to promote such coordination as well as on how other exceptions may require regulatory change to reduce regulatory burden. Comments to the Stark Law RFI are due August 24.  We previously reported on the Stark Law RFI here.

In his testimony, Hargan stated that HHS is also looking at the AKS and its intersection with the Stark Law based on feedback from providers who find it “very difficult if not impossible to understand” how to comply with both laws.  Hargan described a four-agency task force that is working together to examine obstacles to coordinate care related to the Stark Law, the AKS, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)  and rules under 42 CFR Part 2 related to opioid and substance abuse disorder treatment.  This task force is composed of CMS, the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), the HHS Office of Civil Rights, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to “coordinate amongst themselves to facilitate a coordinated care system” to “reduce duplication, overlap and contradictions” in regulations and “ensure regulatory requirements are aligned.”  As part of this effort, Hargan indicated that HHS would soon issue an RFI on AKS reforms as part of the Sprint.

HHS has already begun exploring changes to the AKS regarding drug pricing.  On July 18, 2018, OIG sent a proposed rule to the Office of Management and Budget entitled “Removal Of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates to Plans or PBMs Involving Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection.”  While the text of the proposed rule is not available at this time, the rule is expected to propose revisions to the AKS discount safe harbor to scale back or exclude rebates from drug manufacturers.

How will key trends and developments in health care policy and enforcement impact future litigants? In the latest Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup, we address this question in the context of:

  • Continued interpretations of the landmark Escobar case
  • The latest guidance from US Department of Justice (DOJ) leadership regarding enforcement priorities
  • The uptick in state and federal efforts to combat the opioid crisis
  • Recent court decisions regarding the use of statistical sampling in False Claims Act (FCA) cases
  • A recent increase in regulatory scrutiny of co-location and shared services/equipment arrangements

Materials from our corresponding Q2 webinar can be accessed below.

Click here to read the full issue of the Health Care Enforcement Quarterly Roundup.

Click here to view the archived webinar.

The materiality test articulated in Escobar has become one of the most litigated issues in False Claims Act (FCA) practice. Most courts have taken to heart the Supreme Court’s direction that materiality is a “demanding” and “rigorous” test in which “minor or insubstantial” non-compliance would not qualify as material. However, a recent Sixth Circuit two-to-one decision found that noncompliance with a physician signature timing requirement sufficiently alleged materiality under Escobar, reversing the district court’s dismissal of the case. United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 892 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 2018). This opinion arguably is inconsistent with Escobar. The better analysis of Relator’s complaint would conclude that the Relator pled insufficient facts, under the Rule 9(b) particularity standard, to suggest that the untimely physician signature somehow resulted in the government paying for home health services for which it otherwise would not have paid.

Case Summary

This decision was Relator’s second time before the Sixth Circuit litigating the complaint she filed in 2012 against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., and related entities (Brookdale) after the government declined to intervene. The dispute centers around compliance with the regulation, 42 C.F.R. §424.22(a), which pertains to home health services. Section 424.22(a) provides that a “physician must certify the patient’s eligibility for the home health benefit,” including that the individual is home bound and eligible for home care under Medicare’s coverage rules. Subsection (a)(2) has a timing requirement for this certification; “the certification of need for home health services must be obtained at the time the plan of care is established or as soon thereafter as possible and must be signed and dated by the physician who establishes the plan.” Relator alleged that she was engaged to help Brookdale deal with a large backlog of Medicare claims, including obtaining physician certifications months after a patient’s treatment began. She argued that claims with these “late” certifications violated § 424.22(a)(2) and rendered those claims false under an implied certification theory. Continue Reading Timing is Everything: The Sixth Circuit’s Application of the Materiality Test

On June 25, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published a request for information, seeking input from the public on how to address any undue regulatory impact and burden of the physician self-referral law (Stark Law) on value-based and other coordinated care arrangements designed to improve quality and lower cost. While the overall focus of CMS’s request for information is on the Stark Law’s actual or perceived barriers to innovation, the request also gives the health care industry a unique opportunity to comment on and request revisions or clarifications for any significant Stark Law provision, including the provisions regarding fair market value, volume or value, and commercial reasonableness, as well as the Stark “group practice” definition.

As part of its focus to shift from a fee-for-service to a value-based health care delivery system, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) launched a “Regulatory Sprint to Coordinated Care,” which is focused on identifying regulatory barriers to coordinated care. CMS identified aspects of the Stark Law that may create obstacles to participation in integrated delivery models, alternative payment models, and other arrangements incentivizing improvements in outcomes and reductions in costs, and is seeking input on revisions or additions to exceptions to the Stark Law.

The Stark Law is largely indifferent to the good faith intentions of health systems to integrate and enter into coordinated care arrangements with physicians, and continues to impose on health systems burdens of proof that the arrangements comply with ambiguous standards like fair market value, volume or value and commercial reasonableness. While financial transactions incident to CMS’s innovative care delivery and payment initiatives, such as accountable care organizations (ACOs), medical homes and bundled payment arrangements can be protected by certain fraud and abuse/Stark Law waivers, there are other common transactions and arrangements with physicians still operating in a fee-for-service environment (such as practice acquisitions, employment, “gainsharing,” service line co-management, pay-for-quality and non-ACO clinically integrated networks) that are not protected by the waivers. CMS’s request for information provides a welcome opportunity for the health care industry to educate CMS on the obstacles the Stark Law presents for innovative coordinated care arrangements with physicians.

In its request, CMS posed 20 specific requests for information on novel financial arrangements and alternative payment models, the applicability of current Stark Law exceptions to such arrangements, and what additional exceptions or revisions to the Stark Law are necessary to protect coordinated care arrangements from Stark Law liability. These requests, however, are so far ranging that they effectively invite comments on just about any Stark Law provision that a stakeholder believes warrants revision or clarification.

Comments are due by 5 pm EDT on August 24, 2018. If you would like assistance in preparing comments, please contact one of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.