In an unusual ruling on August 18, 2017, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Middle District of Tennessee’s denial of the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees, and remanded the case for an award of legal fees and expenses related to defending against the government’s “excessive” damages demand, as well as fees incurred during the appeal and remand process. The case is United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C Construction, LLC, and as we have previously reported, last year the government suffered a major loss when the Sixth Circuit dramatically reduced the damage award in this False Claims Act (FCA) litigation by over 95 percent (from $762,894.54 to $14,748), which resulted in damages of less than 1 percent of the $1.66 million originally claimed by the government. At the time, the Sixth Circuit called the government’s so-called “tainted goods” damage calculation “fairyland rather than actual.” Continue Reading
In US ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community, the Department of Justice has assented to a $275,000 settlement after having rejected a $2.5 million settlement two years ago (despite declining to intervene in the case). This case garnered substantial attention because the relators sought to employ statistical sampling to establish liability on hundreds of millions of dollars of allegedly false claims to Medicare and Medicaid.
Previously, the Fourth Circuit heard–on interlocutory appeal–argument as to (1) whether statistical sampling could be used to establish liability in a False Claims Act case; and (2) whether the government could veto a False Claims Act settlement in a case in which the government declines to intervene. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the government did possess the authority to veto a settlement in a non-intervened case, and refused to address whether sampling could be used to establish liability. We discussed the Fourth Circuit’s decision here.
Although the Fourth Circuit declined to reach the question of whether False Claims Act plaintiffs can establish liability by using statistical sampling, the presiding district court judge had already concluded that plaintiffs could not do so. Having represented to the court that they could not marshal the resources to establish liability on a claim-by-claim basis, the court granted partial summary judgment on the vast majority of claims at issue. The relators subsequently settled for the value of the claims originally at issue: approximately one percent of the claims at issue in this case and 11 percent of what the relators and defendants previously agreed to.
The Fourth Circuit was to be the first appellate court to address the sampling issue, and this case demonstrates the importance of this issue. Where plaintiffs in this arena may lack sufficient resources to prove their cases on a claim-by-claim basis, the use of statistical sampling makes it far more cost-effective to prosecute their cases. If appellate courts rule on this issue in the future, and in favor of defendants, such rulings will deprive plaintiffs of this potential shortcut. This would appropriately limit plaintiffs’ recovery to claims plaintiffs actually prove are false by a preponderance of the evidence.
One of the most litigated issues following the Supreme Court’s Escobar decision is whether the Court created a limited, two-part test to define the implied certification theory under the False Claims Act. In the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the prevailing view confirms that the proper interpretation of Escobar is that the implied certification theory can only proceed when the defendant made specific representations about the goods or services provided and that those representations were rendered misleading due to its failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory or contractual requirements. On August 10, 2017, federal district judge Deborah Batts in the Southern District of New York joined the majority view of her colleagues in U.S. ex. rel. Forcier v. Computer Sciences Corporation and the City of New York in dismissing part of the government’s complaint.
In this case, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a complaint in intervention alleging the City of New York (City) and its billing contractor, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), submitted false claims to the Medicaid program in two ways.
First, DOJ argued that the defendants failed to adhere to Medicaid secondary payor requirements concerning the state’s Early Intervention Program (EIP), which pays for services to children with developmental delays. These requirements obligate municipalities to take “reasonable measures” to determine whether third party insurance coverage was available for the EIP services and seek reimbursement from such available payors. DOJ alleged that CSC and the City did not comply with these requirements by submitting incorrect policy numbers to third party insurers knowing that such claims would be denied and by incorrectly informing Medicaid that no third party coverage existed or such coverage had been rejected. Continue Reading
Following on the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) June announcement that it would begin updating its public-facing Work Plan on a monthly basis, OIG released its first update to add 14 new topics to the Work Plan on July 17. As the health care industry knows, OIG Work Plan sets forth various projects that the OIG’s Office of Audit Services (OAS) and Office of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI) are currently undertaking or planning to undertake in the future. Previously, OIG updated its Work Plan to reflect adjustments once or twice each year. In a stated effort to increase transparency in its audit and inspection work, OIG changed its practices to begin issuing monthly updates.
The 14 topics all describe new OAS audit work, much of which is focused on Medicare and Medicaid issues. Several areas appear to lend themselves to data-mining, such cross-checking claims between Medicare Parts A and B or providers of concurrent services. For example, the OIG aims to:
- Evaluate whether certain Medicare Part B payments for ambulance services are subject to Medicare Part A skilled nursing facility (SNF) consolidated billing requirements (i.e. the SNF received payment for the ambulance transport as part of the Part A payment, and thus was responsible for paying the ambulance provider);
- Compare Medicare Part B and Part A claims to check for overlapping claims between home health agencies and/or hospices and outside providers;
- Investigate the validity of Medicare payments for telehealth services provided at distant sites that do not have corresponding originating site claims; and
- Examine Medicare payments to hospital outpatient providers for non-physician outpatient services provided under the inpatient prospective payment system.
OIG also proposed two more wide-ranging programmatic reviews. First, OIG plans to conduct a study to identify “common characteristics” of “at risk” home health agency providers in an effort to target pre-and post-payment claim reviews. This OAS study appears to be a follow-up to an OEI study issued in June 2016 of “selected characteristics commonly found in OIG-investigated cases of home health fraud.” Second, OIG plans to review hospital electronic medical record incentive payments for compliance with Medicare’s meaningful use requirements. OIG’s continued examination of EMR incentive payments follows on OAS’ June 2017 report estimating that between May 2011 and June 2014, over $729 million was paid to hospitals and physicians who did not comply with the incentive program requirements.
For a full list of the 14 additional inquiries, visit the OIG’s Work Plan website.
On July 10, 2017, US Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a December 3, 2014, district court dismissal of False Claims Act (FCA) claims against Salish Kootenai College (College), a tribal college of the Salish Kootenai Tribes (Tribe). United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc. (July 10, 2017). The 9th Circuit directed the district court to reconsider whether the College is subject to liability under the FCA under a different standard than used by the district court.
The district court had entered its order dismissing claims by the qui tam relators that the College filed false progress reports to the US Department of Health and Human Services and the Indian Health Service in order to retain grant funding from the agencies, holding that the College was an arm of the Tribe and shared the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which had not been waived by the Tribe or Congress. (The district court also dismissed claims against the members of the College board of directors and the College foundation. Relators, however, only appealed the dismissal of claims against the College.)
The court of appeals disagreed with the district court’s framing of the question. The central question is not, as the district court found, whether the College enjoyed tribal immunity and whether such immunity had been waived. Rather, the central issue in a FCA case is whether the College is a “person” within the meaning of the FCA, and, thus subject to liability under the FCA. Accordingly, the court undertook a two-part analysis to decide the question: (1) whether the Tribe is a person under the FCA or a sovereign not subject to the FCA, and, if the latter; (2) whether the College is an arm of the Tribe that shares the Tribe’s sovereign status for purposes of the FCA. Continue Reading
On April 28, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed a relator’s qui tam complaint in United States ex rel. Leysock v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. after concluding that the complaint relied on information obtained resulting from deceptive conduct by the relator’s counsel.
In Leysock, the relator alleged that the defendant caused the submission of false claims to Medicare by promoting Forest’s dementia drug, Namenda, for off-label label use. After the United States declined to intervene, Forest filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court denied, largely based upon detailed allegations about eight prescribing physicians who prescribed Namenda for off-label use by Medicare beneficiaries. These allegations, the Court reasoned, were sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which in False Claims Act cases typically requires plaintiffs to plead specific allegations regarding the alleged fraud, tying alleged misconduct to the submission of false claims to a government payor.
Through discovery, Forest subsequently learned that relators’ counsel had obtained the information underlying these detailed allegations from a survey conducted by an individual whom relators’ counsel had contracted. This contractor misled the physicians about why he was conducting the survey (not disclosing that he had been retained by the relators in a False Claims Act action) and coaxed the physicians into turning over detailed patient information to the contractor.
In response, the Court concluded that this deception violated Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1(a), which prohibits a lawyer or his agent from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. Consequently, the court concluded, this conduct violated Local Rule 83.6.1 of the United States District Court. As a remedy, the Court struck these allegations, noting that “[the contractor’s] study was conducted solely for the purpose of ensuring that the complaint survived a motion to dismiss,” i.e., to ensure that the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.
Although the relators’ conduct in this case is unlikely to be repeated in future cases, this case underscores the challenges relators can face in meeting Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. These challenges are particularly acute in non-intervened qui tam cases, where the government fails to provide the relator with information about specific false claims that the defendant allegedly submitted or caused to be submitted. Imposing these challenges will continue to chill would-be relators, without firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing, from bringing meritless qui tam cases.
We reported back in March on the US District Court for the District of Columbia’s summary judgment decision in the Lance Armstrong/Floyd Landis/US Postal Service (USPS) False Claims Act (FCA) litigation, centered on Lance Armstrong’s use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) while he was leading a professional cycling team sponsored by the USPS. A pack of motions in limine (MILs) filed by the parties over the past few weeks suggest that the case may well be headed to trial this fall, and raise some notable legal issues to watch as it continues to unfold, including: Continue Reading
A hospital system in Missouri recently agreed to settle with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) for $34 million to resolve claims related to alleged violations of the Stark Law. On May 18, 2017, DOJ announced a settlement agreement with Mercy Hospital Springfield (Hospital) and its affiliate, Mercy Clinic Springfield Communities (Clinic). The Hospital and Clinic are both located in Springfield, Missouri. The relator’s complaint was filed in the Western District of Missouri’s Southern Division on June 30, 2015.
The complaint’s allegations center on compensation arrangements with physicians who provided services in an infusion center. According to the complaint, until 2009 the infusion center was operated as part of the Clinic, and the physicians who practiced at the infusion center shared in its profits under a collection compensation model. In 2009, ownership of the infusion center was transferred to Mercy Hospital so that it could participate in the 340B drug pricing program, substantially reducing the cost of chemotherapy drugs. The complaint alleges that the physicians “expressed concern about losing a substantial portion of the income they had received under the collection compensation model as a result of the loss of ownership of the Infusion Center.” In response, the Hospital allegedly assured them that they would be “made whole” for any such losses. While it doesn’t provide precise details, the complaint alleges that the Hospital addressed the shortfall by establishing a new work Relative Value Unit (wRVU) for drug administration in the infusion center, which now operated as part of the Hospital. The value of this new wRVU was allegedly calculated by “solving for” the amount of the physician’s loss and “working backwards from a desired level of overall compensation.” Physicians were able to earn the wRVU for the patients they referred to the infusion center. The complaint alleges that the drug administration wRVU rate was 500 percent of the comparable wRVU for in-clinic work. In its announcement of the settlement agreement, DOJ characterized the compensation arrangement as being “based in part on a formula that improperly took into account the value of [the physicians’] referrals of patients to the infusion center operated by [the Hospital].” Continue Reading
On May 31, 2017, the US Department of Justice announced a Settlement Agreement under which eClinicalWorks, a vendor of electronic health record software, agreed to pay $155 million and enter into a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement to resolve allegations that it caused its customers to submit false claims for Medicare and Medicaid meaningful use payments in violation of the False Claims Act.
On May 16, 2017, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision in US ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc. In this case, the government had contracted with a private security company to provide guards at a military airbase in Iraq. Although the applicable contract required the guards to have certain marksmanship scores, the defendant (as alleged by the relator and the government) failed to employ guards with the requisite qualifications.
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision is the continuation of a years-long battle between the plaintiffs and Triple Canopy over whether the operative complaint adequately pleads violations of the False Claims Act. The Fourth Circuit previously held that the complaint had done so, but after Triple Canopy petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the high court’s recent Escobar decision.