One of the more concerning trends for the defense bar in False Claims Act cases is an uptick in parallel criminal and civil proceedings. While the pursuit of parallel proceedings is long-standing DOJ policy, the last few years have seen a “doubling down” by the government on the use of these proceedings — for instance, the 2014 Department of Justice policy requiring an automatic criminal division review of each qui tam complaint and the 2015 Yates Memorandum’s requirement for defendants to identify all culpable individuals to obtain “cooperation” credit in reaching a resolution with the government. From the defense side, parallel proceedings raise important and troublesome issues, including protecting the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights while mounting a robust defense in the civil case. But, as shown in recent decisions from the Eastern District of Kentucky and Southern District of New York, parallel proceedings may also prove challenging to DOJ when a judge is impatient with the progress of case on its docket or when the relator is not on board with how the government would like the case to proceed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA) as to several individual defendants.
In Howell v. Town of Ball, a Ball, Louisiana police officer, Howell, sued the town and several town officials for employment retaliation in violation of the FCA (among other claims). The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that the FCA creates a cause of action only against a plaintiff’s employer. The district court agreed, citing the subsection of the FCA that creates a cause of action for those “discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (emphasis added).
On appeal, Howell argued that a 2009 amendment to the FCA (which removed the reference to “employer” in § 3730(h)) “indicate[d] a legislative intent to broaden the class of viable defendants.” In a July 1 decision, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Howell, holding that “the reference to an ‘employer’ was deleted to account for the broadening of the class of FCA plaintiffs to include ‘contractors’ and ‘agents,’ not to provide liability for individual, non-employer defendants.”
In sum, FCA plaintiffs can only bring retaliation actions against their actual employers, notwithstanding the role that other non-employer individuals may have had in allegedly retaliatory activity.
On September 1, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit largely affirmed dismissal of a relator’s amended complaint pursuant to the particularity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In US ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, the relator, a nurse, alleged that a number of practices at a clinic where she worked were not medically necessary. These were: requiring patients to see multiple practitioners before receiving medication; requiring patients to undergo mandatory drug screenings at each visit; and requiring patients to come to the clinic in-person in order to receive a prescription or speak to a doctor. (The relator also alleged that clinic misused a billing code. This was the only claim the Seventh Circuit permitted to go forward.) In dismissing the majority of the relator’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit began with a robust discussion of the importance of Rule 9(b) in screening out baseless False Claims Act (FCA) claims:
Rule 9 requires heightened pleading standards because of the stigmatic injury that potentially results from allegations of fraud. We have observed, moreover, that fraud is frequently charged irresponsibly by people who have suffered a loss and want to find someone to blame for it. The requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity compels the plaintiff to provide enough detail to enable the defendant to riposte swiftly and effectively if the claim is groundless. It also forces the plaintiff to conduct a careful pretrial investigation and thus operates as a screen against spurious fraud claims. (Citations and quotations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit held that the relator fell far short of Rule 9(b), because she provided “no medical, technical, or scientific context which would enable a reader of the complaint to understand why Acacia’s alleged actions amount to unnecessary care.” The court further observed that the relator did not offer any reasons why the practices were unnecessary other than her “personal view” — the complaint was devoid of any context, such as a comparison of relator’s clinic’s practices to others in the industry. And while the relator attempted to rely on her 20 years of “experience and training,” this was simply not enough. The court concluded by holding that a relator’s subjective evaluation, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for a fraud claim.
The lesson of this case is clear: where an FCA complaint alleges that care was medically unnecessary (as many FCA complaints do), the relator must provide sufficient reasons, other than relying on his or her personal opinion, experience and training, as to why. A relator cannot simply assert that care was unnecessary and hope to fill in the blanks with discovery.
As part of a settlement agreement reached on August 23, three hospitals and their former parent system agreed to pay $2.95 million to resolve state and federal False Claims Act (FCA) allegations that they failed to investigate and repay overpayments from the New York Medicaid program in a timely manner under the so-called “60 Day Rule.” The allegations were originally made by a former employee via a 2011 qui tam suit, United States of America ex rel. Kane v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc.
Under the 60 Day Rule, enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, providers are required to report and return overpayments within 60 days of identification. When “identification” happens has been the subject of much debate, and was one of the main issues in the decision issued by the US District Court in the Southern District of New York last year, which denied Continuum’s motion to dismiss the government’s complaint. Despite repaying all of the improper claims, the government alleged in Kane that Continuum and the hospitals “fraudulently delay[ed] repayments” for up to two years after it had identified them. As has become the custom in the Southern District of New York, the settlement agreement contains certain admissions by Continuum concerning the covered conduct, including that beginning in 2009, a software compatibility issue caused them to mistakenly submit improper claims to the New York Medicaid program, the billing errors were brought to their attention over the course of late 2010 and early 2011, and that Continuum began to reimburse Medicaid for the 444 improper claims in February 2011 and concluded repayment in March 2013.
While Kane was the first court to directly grapple with the issue of when a provider had “identified” an overpayment, the Kane court’s interpretation of “identify” has been essentially supplanted by the final rule released by Medicare in February 2016. The final rule makes clear that a provider can conduct “reasonable diligence” into whether it has received an overpayment and can quantify the amount of such overpayment without triggering the 60-day clock. Even with the final rule, there continue to be significant questions about what constitutes “reasonable diligence” and how the rule intersects with the FCA’s reverse false claims cause of action, which only is triggered by knowingly concealing or knowingly and improperly avoiding or decreasing an overpayment retained in violation of the rule.
The Kane case and settlement confirm the interest of the government and relators in examining overpayment and 60 Day Rule issues under the FCA. The potential ramifications can be significant — the settlement amount is more than triple the $844,000 in overpayments Continuum originally received from (and repaid to) Medicaid. It may be advisable for providers to review their policies and procedures for addressing and resolving potential overpayment issues and maintaining documentation of those efforts to defend their actions if questioned by the government.
The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reviewed a district court’s dismissal of an FCA claim against the City of Chicago, in which the relator alleged that the City’s certifications of compliance with civil rights laws were false because the City engaged in practices which increased racial segregation. The case is United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chicago, and can be found here.
On August 22, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the relator’s complaint for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. 9(b). The most notable takeaway from this case is the court’s holding that where the complaint itself did not specify which statutes and regulations the City violated (and with which it thus falsely certified compliance), the relator could not rely on more specific statutory and regulatory references later identified in his briefs. The court observed: “If the particularity requirement is meant to ensure more thorough investigation before filing, it is not too much to ask that one aspect of that investigation include the specific provisions of law whose violation made the certification of compliance false. Moreover, if, as in this case, a defendant is presented with an undifferentiated raft of statutory and regulatory provisions, it will be nearly impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense.” In other words, Rule 9(b) requires an FCA relator to plead his or her theory of fraud with specificity, and to do so in the complaint. Where the alleged fraud is based on a regulatory or statutory violation, relators cannot punt articulating what that statute or regulation actually was.
The court found a number of other Rule 9(b) pleading deficiencies in addition to the foregoing, serving as a reminder that the rule is a powerful tool to weed out meritless FCA claims.
On August 22, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision in Carlson v. DynCorp International LLC, affirming the district court’s dismissal of an ex-employee’s retaliation suit under the False Claims Act’s (FCA) anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). While the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court applied a standard “rendered erroneous by recent amendments to the statute,” the court nonetheless affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing the case.
Scott Carlson (Carlson) was employed by private military contractor DynCorp International LLC (DynCorp). Because DynCorp had substantial government contracts, it was subject to certain accounting and billing standards dictated by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. Carlson alleged that DynCorp engaged in improper billing practices on existing government contracts, including one with the US Agency for International Development (USAID), by hiding indirect and overhead costs in an unbillable code. Carlson further alleged that DynCorp fraudulently obtained a new contract from USAID because DynCorp’s bid on the new contract contained a false certification that DynCorp was complying with the accounting and billing standards of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. Carlson claims that after raising the issue with management, DynCorp terminated him. Carlson filed his FCA suit for retaliatory termination in the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court dismissed Carlson’s case with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Continue Reading
The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion overturning a district court’s grant of summary judgment against a False Claims Act (FCA) relator in United States ex rel. Driscoll v. Todd Spencer M.D. Medical Group, Inc. on August 9, 2016. The case involved allegations by Scott Driscoll, M.D., a radiologist who had worked for the defendant medical group, that the medical group and its principal, Dr. Todd Spencer, performed unnecessary procedures and unbundled certain procedures in order to bill for multiple procedures rather than just one at a higher reimbursement rate.
The district court had granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the amended complaint failed to satisfy the particularity standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Specifically, the district court held that although the relator alleged the performance of certain unnecessary procedures and improper unbundling of procedures, the claims failed to sufficiently describe the details of the alleged scheme by failing to allege the “who, what, when, where, and how of the scheme.” For example, the district court found that the complaint lacked particularity in identifying the persons who performed the unnecessary services and submitted inflated bills. Moreover, the district court found that the relator failed to flesh out how the scheme worked and to provide facts regarding a protocol that was allegedly developed by Spencer and appeared to be the basis for the relator’s claims related to the performance of unnecessary procedures. The district court held that any subsequent amendment to the compliant would be futile and dismissed it with prejudice, noting that in a prior order related to the initial complaint, it had given the relator “one and only one” opportunity to amend the complaint and specific instructions on how to cure the complaint’s factual deficiencies.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that certain of the allegations in the complaint were sufficiently specific that the defendants could answer the complaint and defend against the charges. Citing its holding in Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz (616 F. 3d 993 (2010)) the Ninth Circuit noted that, under Rule 9(b), it is sufficient to allege particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted. Moreover, a plaintiff need only provide enough detail to give the defendant notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that he or she can defend against the charge and not just deny that he or she has done anything wrong. The Ninth Circuit contrasted the facts in Driscoll with those in Ebeid (in which the court ultimately found that the claims failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b)) in that in Driscoll, the relator had personal knowledge of the defendants’ practices whereas, in Ebeid, the relator was not an insider, “so his claim depended on speculation.” However, the opinion does not elaborate on how such a difference contributed to the court’s determination that the Rule 9(b) pleading standard had been met in Driscoll.
Finding that only a portion of the compliant was sufficiently specific, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to allow the relator to amend the complaint to address the deficiencies and narrow the scope of the complaint so that the litigation would be manageable.
Although Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Driscoll was not published and does not have precedential value, it illustrates that some courts may give certain relators with personal knowledge of an alleged fraudulent scheme more leeway in meeting their Rule 9(b) burdens. However, Rule 9(b) continues to set a demanding standard that should be enforced by courts to guard against frivolous claims.
In a decision issued August 8th, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a whistleblower’s False Claims Act (FCA) suit alleging the University of Minnesota Medical Center-Fairview (UMMC) wrongly claimed a “children’s hospital” exemption to Medicaid cuts based on a reasonable interpretation of an unclear state law.
In 2011, Minnesota passed an amendment that cut Medicaid reimbursement levels for inpatient services by 10 percent, but exempted “children’s hospitals.” The law did not define the term “children’s hospital,” instead the statute exempted “children’s hospitals whose inpatients are predominantly under 18 years of age” from the rate cut. UMMC believed that the University of Minnesota Children’s Hospital should qualify for this exemption and contacted the Minnesota Department of Human Services (MDHS) to obtain confirmation. In 2012, MDHS issued the exemption and a retroactive refund.
The relator, an MDHS official who claimed to be the drafter of the exemption language, complained within MDHS that UMMC’s children’s hospital did not qualify based on the intended meaning of the term “children’s hospital.” After further review prompted by the relator, MDHS reversed its position, finding a “lack of clarity in the statutory definition of what constitutes a children’s hospital” but that the UMMC exemption was not “consistent with the law or how other similarly situated children’s facilities are treated” and sought return of the retroactive refund. The Minnesota Legislature later amended the law in May 2014 to retroactively exempt all UMMC Medicaid patients aged under 18 from the rate reduction.
The relator’s suit, filed in September 2013, alleged that UMMC knew that University of Minnesota Children’s Hospital (which is a unit inside a larger hospital) did not legally qualify as a “children’s hospital” under the state law. The relator attempted to characterize UMMC’s efforts to obtain an exemption as making false claims or false statements to MDHS as well as support for a “reverse false claims” theory because, according to relator’s logic, UMMC had an obligation to refund the money received after obtaining the exemption because UMMC knew it was not entitled to the exemption in the first place.
The district court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the relator. Both courts found that the state law was unclear and “in the absence of a statutory definition of ‘children’s hospital,’ it was reasonable for UMMC to inquire about the proper classification of its children’s unit … A reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language does not give rise to a FCA claim.” The relator relied heavily on his role as drafter of the relevant amendment and the legislature’s historical treatment of children’s hospitals in making his arguments. The court found “this reliance cripples his argument. Legislative history is properly consulted only in light of a textual ambiguity.”
Whether a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous law can state a claim under the FCA has been the subject of several recent decisions in favor of defendants, many of which we have covered on this blog, such as:
An unusual aspect of UMMC’s litigation battle with the relator was the initial approval of UMMC’s interpretation by the state, as well as what effectively was a subsequent ratification of that position by the state legislature. In any event, this latest decision confirms that we can anticipate more judicial skepticism of FCA claims involving conflicting, but reasonable, interpretations of ambiguous laws. This growing line of cases is important where the Supreme Court has now recognized implied certification as a theory of liability, pursuant to which FCA claims are based on alleged violations of underlying regulations, statutes or contract provisions. Purported violations of ambiguous laws will not support such implied certification claims.
The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit today issued a decision affirming a district court’s grant of summary judgment against a False Claims Act (FCA) relator in United States ex rel. Donegan v. Anesthesia Associates of Kansas City, PC, on which we previously posted. The case involved a dispute over whether a regulation required an anesthesiologist to be present in the operating room when the patient “emerges” from anesthesia, and the district court had granted summary judgment on the grounds that the defendant had reasonably interpreted the regulation as not requiring presence in the operating room. The district court’s decision was important because it made clear that the defendant’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation need not be the “most reasonable” interpretation.
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that the relator could not establish scienter because the regulation was ambiguous, and the defendant’s interpretation was objectively reasonable. The court held:
Here, the question is whether AAKC’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous regulation precludes a finding that it knowingly submitted false or fraudulent claims, even if CMS or a reviewing court would interpret the regulation differently. Relator simply failed to submit evidence refuting AAKC’s strong showing that its interpretation was objectively reasonable. Relator’s experts expressed their opinions that emergence as referred to in Step Three should end before an AAKC patient is transferred to the PACU. But Relator’s contention that the Medicare regulations be interpreted in this fashion is a claim of regulatory noncompliance, not an FCA claim of knowing fraud. (internal citations and quotations omitted)
This result underscores the fact that an FCA case based on alleged noncompliance with a regulation that is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations can be a risky endeavor for a relator.
On July 27, 2016, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California issued a ruling in United States ex rel. Hastings v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Inc., affirming the district court dismissal of a qui tam suit on the grounds that the relator was not an original source.
The relator had sued Wells Fargo and a number of other lending institutions under the Federal Claims Act (FCA), claiming they had falsely certified to the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that they were in compliance with a regulation requiring borrowers to make a down payment of at least 3%. Federal regulations allow this down payment to be paid via gift, so long as repayment for the gift is not “expected or implied.” See U.S. ex rel. Hastings v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n (Inc.), 2014 WL 3519129, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2014) (summarizing HUD regulations).
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the gravamen of the allegations (that certain charities were, with the tacit approval the defendants, making “gifts” to borrowers that were ultimately repaid) had already been disclosed in various public documents that predated the qui tam suit. Because of these public disclosures, the suit could only proceed if the relator was an “original source” of the information, per 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The district court held that the relator, a real estate agent, was not an original source because his knowledge of the charities and their gift programs was secondhand. The court also held the fact that relator had “offered his view to HUD that [the gift programs] violated HUD standards” to be of no moment, because “[i]dentifying the legal consequences of information already in the public domain does not constitute discovery of fraud.” 2014 WL 3519129, at *11.
On appeal, the relator argued that the district court incorrectly applied the 1986 FCA definition of “original source” (someone who has “direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based”) instead of the 2010 definition (someone who “(1) prior to a public disclosure … has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions”). Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1986) with 31 USC. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2010). The Ninth Circuit panel unanimously held that the relator was not an original source under either definition. Regarding the former, it held that his knowledge was not “direct and independent” where it was “assembled from information available to all members of the Multiple State Listing Service.” 2016 WL 4011199, at *1. Regarding the latter, it held that the relator had merely provided the government with information that did not “materially add to [the] public disclosures,” citing the fact that the gift programs in question “were extensively examined in proposed rules, internal audits, a GAO report, and congressional hearings.” Id. at *2.
In sum, the FCA’s original source requirement represents a high bar for qui tam plaintiffs. Suits brought by relators who are not true insider “whistleblowers” with first-hand knowledge of the alleged fraud are remain highly vulnerable to dismissal on the pleadings.